State of Utah v. Dominique Hernandez : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
State of Utah v. Dominique Hernandez : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elizabeth Hunt; Attorney for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Kenneth R. Updegrove; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Hernandez, No. 20020879 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4022
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 







OPENING BRIEF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, entered in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
William W. Barrett, presiding. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT, 84114-0854 
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE 
ELIZABETH HUNT (#5292) 
3194 SOUTH 1100 East, #202 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84106 
Telephone: (801)706-1114 
ATTORNEY FOR MR. HERNANDEZ 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 




K F U FILED 
SO ^ _ UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DOCKET NO. *>- JUN 23 2004 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 







OPENING BRIEF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, entered in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
William W. Barrett, presiding. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT, 84114-0854 
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE 
ELIZABETH HUNT (#5292) 
3194 SOUTH 1100 East, #202 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84106 
Telephone: (801)706-1114 
ATTORNEY FOR MR. HERNANDEZ 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
FACTS ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL 3 
FACTS PERTAINING TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL . . . 11 
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE 12 
FAILURE TO EXCLUDE HERNANDEZ'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 17 
INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLET 21 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 22 
ARGUMENTS 23 
I. THE ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION REQUIRES A NEW 
TRIAL 23 
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
30 
A. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE . . . 30 
B. FAILURE TO EXCLUDE HERNANDEZ'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 34 
C. INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLET 40 
D. FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM ILLEGAL 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 42 
E. FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY 46 
CONCLUSION 50 
ADDENDUM 
Reasonable Doubt Instruction 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 23B Remand 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 i 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10 i 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 i 
United States Constitution, Amendment V i 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI ii 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV§ 1 ii 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 ii 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 ii 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 iii 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 iii 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 iv 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 v 
ii 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 v 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 v 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 v 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 vi 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606 vii 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 vii 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279 (1991) 25 
Cage v. Louisiana. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) 24 
Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) 26 
Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945) 30, 34 
Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 683 (1985) 30, 34 
Davis v. Mississippi. 394 U.S. 721 (1969) 44 
Haves v. Florida. 470 U.S. 811 (1985) 44 
Holland v. United States. 348 U.S. 121 (1954) 24 
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) 44 
Kavsville Citv v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App.), cert denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1997) 43 
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994) 28 
State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) 36-37 
State v. Bennett. 2000 UT 34, 999 P.2d 1 26 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) 26 
State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) 44 
State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) 42 
State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000) 38-39 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 23 
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989) 28-29 
iv 
State v. Galleeos. 967 P.2d 973 (Utah 1998) 41,45-46-, 49 
State v. Harding. 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981) 30 
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 29 
State v. Jordan. 196 P. 565 (Utah 1921) 26 
State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App.), reversed on other grounds. 925 P.2d 937 
(Utah 1996) 34 
State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980) 26 
State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191 24 
State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 376 49 
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995) 40 
State v. Moritzskv. 771 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989) 28-29 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29,497 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 27, 30 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 46,49 
State v. Reyes. 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841 1, 24-29 
State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds. State v. 
Weeks. 2002 UT 98, 61 P.3d 1000 25-29 
State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951 29, 34,41 
State v. Smedlev. 2003 UT App 79, 67 P.3d 1005 28-29, 35, 49 
State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993) 42-49 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) 31-39 
State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) 44 
v 
State v. Warren. 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270 43 
State v. Webster. 2001 UT App 238, 32 P.3d 976 38 
State v. Wight. 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988) 36 
State v. Wright. 2004 UT App 102, 90 P.3d 644 2 
Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275 (1993) 24-30 
Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211 (Utah), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 1050(1994) 34 
United States v. Alarcon-Gonzales. 73 F.3d 289 (10th Cir. 1996) 45 
United States v. Guzman-Bruno. 27 F.3d 420 (9th Cir.). cert, denied. 513 U.S. 975 (1994) 
45 
United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir.), cert denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 343 
(1999) 28 
United States v. Parra. 2 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir.). cert, denied. 510 U.S. 1026(1993) . . . 4 5 
Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 44 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 12, 24, 30, 46 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10 24,41 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 24, 38, 31 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 24 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 24, 28, 30 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV§ 1 24 
vi 
Utah< ode Ann .
 N MI I m l M 
I l,ih i udi Ann < n<> f> U)"» 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 31, 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 .1 
I 'lali I •' i l l ' i>H I I I I I I I I . I I I ' l f i i ' l ' i n I ' 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 34 
Utah Rule of Fvidence<r* 38 
Utah Rule o: : ....„„ . 38 
Mliili Kii lc • " 38 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 38 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606 21 
I Hal of Evidence 609 36 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 







Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this first degree 
felony case transferred from the Utah Supreme Court (R. 251). 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Does the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction require a new trial? 
Jury instructions are reviewed on appeal for correctness, with no deference to the trial 
court. See, e ^ , State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8 at If 14, 84 P.3d 841. 
This issue was not raised below, and in raising it for the first time on appeal, 
Hernandez asserts the plain error, exceptional circumstances, and ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrines. 
2. Does ineffective assistance of trial counsel require a new trial? 
This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for correctness, See, 
e.g.. State v.Maestas. 1999 UT 32, If 20,984 P.2d 376, deferring to the trial court's findings 
of fact after a .. •.. Hearing, Mate v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, ^ 7, 90 P.3d 644. 
h- Utah R. App. P. 23B(R. 266-268, 
375-402, R. 470-75). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULE 
I IK: follow . ,<• in. < o|ii i i l in Ih 
addendum: Constitution of Utah, Article I §§ i nited States Constitution, 
Amendments V ^1. end XIV§ 1; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1 -501. "6-6-301,76-6-302. am'"" 
1 •(• <.u: Kiii^ > • < • miinal Procedure 12 and 24; .., .,.,. .; hviaence n , \ 
•I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
l i . . .V.;... ..L • .v •. 
IHon\ ' . 76-6-30? ! 
David P.S. Mack of thv i,-.ii Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed as Mr 
Hernandez's trial counsel (R. 19). 
A 
Hernandez to a term of five years to life, to run concurrently with his federal sentence on 
October 8, 2002 (K. 228-229. R r~ ., "' 
Trial counsel nku uun.i> nohtui wi appeal vU. 230, 244). 
i In ii ili mil 1111111 i mi l ' . i l l 1111 h i l l i nun I I I I I I I I I l l u i i i m k ' ' Is. ph, |inlh < il I) 
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ineffective assistance by trial counsel (R. 470-75). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FACTS ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL 
John Nieser testified that on December 4, 2001, at about 6:30 p.m., he was near 
Freeway Transmissions located at 847 West 1017 South, when a man approached, said hello, 
stuck a gun in his face, and told him to give him is wallet or else (R. 254 at 12-15). Nieser 
gave him his wallet containing about $774 in cash, and the robber told him to get back in his 
truck and not follow him (R. 254 at 17-18). 
The robbery lasted from four to five minutes (R. 254 at 19), and that there was a light 
right across the street on the north side of 17th South right across from the building (R. 254 
at 19). On cross-examination he conceded that the area was not well lit, and it was dark at 
that time of day (R. 254 at 34). On re-direct, he maintained that the streetlight provided 
enough light for him to see the robber's face (R. 254 at 46-47). 
He said his blood pressure was sky high during the robbery (R. 254 at 36). 
He said that after the robbery, he sat in his truck for about five minutes so his heart 
rate would go down, because he had had two heart attacks the year before and was very 
worried about having another (R. 254 at 19-20). 
At the preliminary hearing, he said he sat in his truck for five to ten minutes after the 
robbery before going inside Freeway Transmission to report it (R. 253 at 5). 
When the prosecutor asked Nieser if he was trying to look at the robber to see what 
3 
he looked like and was wearing, Nieser said he noticed the robber's clothes (R. 254 at 21). 
He told dispatch that the robber was a male Hispanic, about twenty years old, five feet eight 
inches tall, and about one hundred and sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22). He told dispatch the 
robber had short brown hair and had a goatee and facial hair that looked like he had not 
shaved for a day (R. 254 at 22). The robber had a blue shirt with writing on the front of it 
(R. 254 at 22). The pants were black baggy pants with big pockets (R. 254 at 23). The 
robber also had white tennis shoes (R. 254 at 23). Dispatch also asked the direction the 
robber was headed (R. 254 at 23). 
Nieser saw the police driving around the neighborhood of Freeway Transmission 
within a couple of minutes of his call, and they stopped about five minutes later (R. 254 at 
36). Within an hour, Detective Wallace and another officer came and got him and told him 
they "had a suspect that fit the description and wanted to know if [Nieser] could ID him." (R. 
254 at 23-24, 44). 
The police brought Hernandez out into the parking lot and put him next to a wall and 
shined headlights and a spot light on him (R. 254 at 24, 39). There was other lighting also 
and the area was very well lit (R. 254 at 40). When they began the show-up, Nieser said it 
was too bright and they turned the lights down at his request (R. 254 at 41). Nieser viewed 
Hernandez for five to ten minutes from a distance of 37 feet (R. 254 at 25). Nieser 
recognized Hernandez, but told the police his shirt was different (R. 254 at 25). Hernandez 
appeared Hispanic, with the same height and weight he had described (R. 254 at 25). He was 
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wearing black baggy pants with big pockets, and white tennis shoes, and had scraggly facial 
hair (R. 254 at 26). He was wearing a different shirt, which was black, and after they lifted 
a few of the suspects shirts up, there was a blue one with writing on it, the same shirt as the 
robber wore (R. 254 at 26,41). There was nothing about Hernandez that did not match the 
robber (R. 254 at 27). 
Nieser told the police his heart rate was up and he was worried, but he did not say he 
might not be sure, but said he was 100 percent sure after he cleared up the shirt problem (R. 
254 at 41). 
He maintained that the lettering on the shirt was three to four inches tall, and testified 
that he had never testified that it was across the side, because the writing was across the front 
(R. 254 at 42). He maintained that the portion of the preliminary hearing transcript, which 
said the writing was across the side, should have reflected that the writing was on the front 
of the shirt (R. 254 at 42). 
The prosecutor, apparently trying to minimize the discrepancy between the weight of 
the robber provided by Nieser, 160 pounds, and Hernandez's actual weight recorded one 
week after his arrest, 145 pounds (R. 254 at 75), led Nieser to testify that Hernandez's outer 
shirt was baggy, giving the impression that he was heavier than he was (R. 254 at 28). When 
trial counsel pointed out that the robber was supposedly not wearing this outer shirt during 
the robbery (R. 254 at 43), Nieser testified on re-direct that the robber's blue shirt was also 
baggy, depending on how he moved (R. 254 at 47). 
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Nieser maintained that the robber did not I lave any outer clothing, just a short sleeved 
shirt, and was not wearing any bandana (R. 254 at 47-48). 
Nieser maintained that Hernandez was the robber, the same person he identified at the 
preliminary hearing, and that Hernandez had a smirk at the preliminary hearing like he did 
in the robbery, and like he did in the photo of the show-up (R. 254 at 29-30). 
Nieser was wearing one inch heels during the robbery, and had testified at the 
preliminary hearing that the robber was his height, 57" or 5*8" (R. 254 at 31, 37-38), but 
could not recall having told the dispatcher that the robber's height was between 5f8" and 
5' 10" (R. 254 at 3 8). The robber was just over an arm5 s length away from him, and he stared 
at him for several minutes and believed the person was the same height (R. 254 at 46). 
Hernandez is 5f4,f (R. 254 at 75). 
When defense counsel alluded to Nieser's preliminary hearing testimony regarding 
why the robber looked Hispanic and asked him why he did, Nieser testified, "I don't know, 
he just did. He looked Hispanic to me." (R. 254 at 37). He did not notice any accent, and 
it was not Hernandez's coloring or his size or anything else that made him seem Hispanic (R. 
254 at 37). When counsel asked Nieser if he remembered saying that the person's goatee and 
hairdo made him look Hispanic, he said he did, and also recalled denying that a certain hairdo 
and goatee meant a person was Hispanic (R. 254 at 44). He did not recall having said that 
he thought the suspect was Hispanic because his heart rate was up and it was dark at Freeway 
Transmission (R. 254 at 44). 
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He did not tell dispatch about scarring or jewelry, but Hernandez' forehead was 
scarred and he had an earring in his left ear on the night of his arrest (R. 254 at 45). 
Nieser did not recall not remembering the robber's shoes at the preliminary hearing 
(R. 254 at 39). He remembered telling dispatch about the shoes, but later may have forgotten 
that detail (R. 254 at 39). 
He identified the gun in evidence as positively being the same gun used by the robber, 
although the gun in evidence does not match either the description given to dispatch (black) 
or the description he provided at the preliminary hearing (grey with a silver or chrome part) 
(R. 254 at 15, 34-35). 
Officer Rich Brede heard the dispatch broadcast an attempt to locate the armed robber 
at 6:39 p.m. (R. 254 at 49-52). The robber was male, Hispanic, in his twenties, with black 
pants, a blue shirt, and a scruffy beard or moustache (R. 254 at 52-53). The gun used by the 
robber was black (R. 254 at 74). The robber was originally reported to be running Eastbound 
(R. 254 at 64). He got a supplemental dispatch indicating that the suspect may have been 
wearing white tennis shoes and running Southbound from the scene of the robbery, 780 West 
and 1700 South (R. 254 at 54, 63). They investigated various businesses in the area and 
ended up going to the Flying J on 2400 South and 900 West, which was open twenty four 
hours a day, and south of the robbery (R. 254 at 54-55). 
They checked the various parts of the building, and found Hernandez sitting in the 
trucker's television lounge and felt that he matched the description (R. 254 at 55-56). He 
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appeared to be a male Hispanic in his twenties, and he had white athletic shoes, facial hair 
and hair style matching the description, and clothing that were very similar to the broadcast 
description (R. 254 at 55, 67). At the preliminary hearing, Brede testified that Hernandez 
looked Caucasian or white, as he did in court (R. 254 at 66). Brede thought Hernandez was 
the only one who looked close to the description (R. 254 at 67). 
Hernandez is 5'4" and weighed 145 pounds a week after the arrest (R. 254 at 75). He 
was wearing a bandana around his neck at the time of his arrest (R. 254 at 75). Hernandez 
was wearing black pants, a dark pullover top or jacket or sweatshirt with a hood and white 
shoes (R. 254 at 67-68). It was cold outside that night (R. 254 at 74). 
The officers approached Hernandez and asked him to go to a stairwell outside the 
television room so they could have some privacy from the other people in the room (R. 254 
at 56). Because a handgun had been used, Mclnnes frisked Hernandez (R. 254 at 56). 
Before the frisk, Hernandez denied having a gun, but after Mclnnes said he was going to 
frisk him, Hernandez said he had a gun in his waistband (R. 254 at 56-57). The officers took 
control of his hands, Brede took the gun from Hernandez's left front waistband, and Mclnnes 
cuffed him (R. 254 at 57, 76). The gun had one round in the chamber and four in the 
magazine (R. 254 at 58). 
Hernandez spontaneously told the police that he had bought it recently 
and told Mclnnes he could have the gun (R. 254 at 59). 
Brede took Hernandez's pulse, because he thought it might show that he had been 
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running (R. 254 at 61). His pulse was rapid (R. 254 at 62). Brede was not aware of 
Hernandez' normal pulse rate, and was no expert on whether the rapid pulse he felt was 
normal for Hernandez (R. 254 at 76). His report did not indicate that Hernandez was 
sweating, and Brede did not recall that he was (R. 254 at 76). 
Brede notified dispatch that he had the suspect in custody at 7:09 p.m. (R. 254 at 62). 
Hernandez had a wallet with an ID card in it, but the police did not ask Nieser if it was 
his wallet (R. 254 at 68). Hernandez had a Greyhound ticket, a hat that he may have been 
wearing, a zippered pouch, his driver's license, and a cell phone (R. 254 at 68-69). 
Hernandez had a pillow case containing several books and a notebook containing computer 
disks (R. 254 at 70). Brede did not discuss these items with Hernandez, and did not believe 
that any of these items came from Nieser (R. 254 at 71). 
After Mclnnes took Hernandez to the show-up, Brede talked to Paul Ardis, who was 
in the Flying J Truck stop and who said that Mr. Hernandez had been at the truck stop some 
considerable time, although he did not say Hernandez was there when the robbery occurred 
(R. 254 at 72,79). Ardis said he had been talking with Hernandez at the truck stop two hours 
earlier, at about 5:16, and that Ardis had come into the trucker's lounge at 6:56 and saw 
Hernandez in there at that time (R. 254 at 80-81). Brede did not ask Ardis how long Ardis 
had been out of the lounge before he came back in at 6:56 (R. 254 at 81). 
There were four to six other people in the television area where Hernandez was 
originally found, but Brede did not interview them (R. 254 at 77). 
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Brede did not find any amount of cash on Hernandez approaching or exceeding $700, 
despite searching the area where Hernandez had been, and searching the area between the 
site of the robbery and the truck stop (R. 254 at 77-80). 
Detective Michelle Ross Mirandized Hernandez, and he agreed to talk to her without 
an attorney present (R. 254 at 85). He told her he got a ride to the truck stop from a truck 
driver (R. 254 at 85). He said the truck driver gave him the gun the police took from him for 
his own protection (R. 254 at 86). Mr. Hernandez asked her to talk to some people at the 
truck stop who could verify that he had been at the truck stop and had not left, but she did 
not interview them (R. 254 at 88). 
Officer Jon Wallace got a dispatch report of a suspect in custody at about 7:00, and 
took Nieser from Freeway Transmissions to the truck stop and described him as being very 
nervous and stressed (R. 254 at 89). He told Nieser that "there was a possible" and asked 
him to come and "get a positive identification to see if it was the same person." (R. 254 at 
90). Nieser was in the back of his car, and when they got to the truck stop, the police already 
had the suspect outside, and Wallace shone his lights on the suspect, who was about thirty 
feet away from his car, to illuminate him and hide Nieser (R. 254 at 90). 
He told Nieser to look at the suspect, take his time, study his features and see if he 
could positively identify him as the robber (R. 254 at 91). Nieser said the suspect looked like 
the robber, but had a different shirt on than the robber did (R. 254 at 91) Wallace had the 
officers lift Hernandez's shirts so Nieser could see each one (R. 254 at 91). Nieser said one 
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of the shirts was the one the robber was wearing and he was positive of that (R. 254 at 92). 
He identified Hernandez as the robber (R. 254 at 92). 
Hernandez told Wallace that witnesses in the truck stop could vouch for the fact that 
he was there at the time of the robbery, but the only one Wallace interviewed was Lamar 
Franklin, who said he was just passing through and could not vouch for Hernandez (R. 254 
at 93). 
FACTS PERTAINING TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
Trial counsel did not take an adequate opportunity to prepare his case with Mr. 
Hernandez prior to trial, due to a variety of circumstances, including Hernandez's repeated 
transfers between state and federal correctional and detention facilities, trial counsel's 
unavailability, and trial counsel's failure to move for a continuance. See Rule 23B Affidavit 
of Trial Counsel (Defendant's Exhibit 17).1 
Trial counsel did not know how to reach Hernandez prior to trial because Hernandez 
was in federal custody, and he made no effort to reach him (R. 478 at 46). 
Before trial, the most time trial counsel spent with Hernandez was sitting next to him 
lending trial, Hernandez was in federal custody in various locations including the 
Weber County Jail (R. 29-34), in Daggett County, and at the Adult Detention Center (R. 
253 at 30). Various hearings had to be continued because he was not transported from 
remote locations. See District Court docket sheet. Prior to the trial, he was sentenced to a 
federal prison in Arizona, and the trial had to be continued so he could return for trial. 
See District Court docket sheet. The district court docket sheet confirms that trial counsel 
was not present at the scheduling conference on May 28, 2002, or pretrial conference on 
July 30, 2002 in district court. See also R. 478 at 13-14, 16. 
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at the preliminary hearing (R. 478 at 75). 
Trial counsel never filed a motion to suppress the gun and Mr. Hernandez's statements 
on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
Trial counsel never filed a motion to suppress the eye-witness identification of 
Hernandez on Article I § 7 grounds. 
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE 
According to Nieser's preliminary hearing and trial testimony, the robbery began at 
about 6:30 and lasted four to five minutes, and he waited between five and ten minutes 
before he went inside to report it (R. 254 at 12-15, 19-20, R. 253 at 5). Dispatch broadcast 
his complaint to the police at 6:39 (R. 254 at 49-52). 
Prior to trial, Hernandez told trial counsel that prior to his arrest, he had been on the 
phone with his relatives and was waiting for a money transfer from his family at or near the 
time of the robbery, but trial counsel did not investigate or present this evidence (R. 478 at 
14-16,28-30,39-40,87). 
He had no strategic reason for failing to investigate how Hernandez arranged for the 
money transfer (R. 478 at 88). 
Trial counsel could not recall exactly what or when Hernandez told him, but believed 
that counsel had taken a note sometime prior to trial indicating that Hernandez said it was not 
him, that he was located an hour later, and that he may have an alibi (R. 478 at 50-51; 
Defendant's Exhibit 4). Trial counsel did not think he had the names and phone numbers of 
12 
Hernandez's relatives prior to trial, but he was not sure about that (R. 478 at 87). He 
conceded that he should have investigated, based on the note (R. 478 at 91). 
Trial counsel knew that one or two days before trial, Hernandez asked him if he had 
tracked down the people he was on the phone with, and trial counsel realized that he had not 
investigated the defense Hernandez had previously told him about (R. 478 at 47). He had no 
strategic reason for failing to investigate the defense (R. 478 at 87). Trial counsel felt it was 
too late to do anything about it, and opted to go with the defense he was planning (R. 478 at 
47). 
He did not consider moving for a continuance (R. 478 at 48). 
Trial counsel explained that his own mother had suffered a stroke and died in the 
months prior to Hernandez's preliminary hearing, and that counsel had been taking Xanax 
to combat depression, and that this resulted in loss of significant memories, such as entire 
conversations he had had (R. 478 at 43, 48, 84-85). This may have influenced his 
performance in this case (R. 478 at 48). 
At some point prior to the deadline for filing a motion for a new trial, trial counsel's 
office received word that there were phone records supporting Hernandez's claim that he was 
at the Flying J Truck stop at the time of the robbery. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial 
Counsel (Defendant's Exhibit 17); Defendant's Exhibit 5 and State's Exhibit 7 (phone memo 
dated 10/10 at 10:47 a.m., provided from the Legal Defender's file, indicating that 
Hernandez had left word for trial counsel that his aunt, Amanda Hernandez, had "the phone 
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transcripts for his appeal" and could be reached at a certain number). 
A subsequent investigation by the office confirmed that there are phone records 
indicating that Hernandez's aunt, Amanda Hernandez, was on the phone with someone at the 
Flying J Truck stop on December 5, 2001, for seven minutes, beginning at 6:22 p.m. See 
Defendant's Exhibits 6 and 21 (telephone bill of Amanda Hernandez); State's Exhibit 1 
(Affidavit of Kath Panteloglow); R. 478 at 52-55). 
Legal Defenders also obtained a phone record confirming that someone from the 
Flying J Truck stop called Margaret Puebla's number, (307)-332-7973, at 6:53 p.m. See 
Defendant's Exhibit 12 and 13 (AMA dump and instruction sheet on how to read AMA 
Dump record, faxed to Legal Defender's Association on November 6,2002); State's Exhibit 
3 (Affidavit of Kath Panteloglow). 
The Legal Defenders Association also received a fax from Hernandez's grandmother, 
Margaret Puebla, confirming that she had tried to send Hernandez a Western Union money 
transfer in the amount of $45 on December 5, 2001, which was sent at 21:58 Eastern 
Standard Time, but was refunded to her on December 12, 2001. See Defendant's Exhibit 7 
(phone memo dated 11/1 at 1:51 p.m., provided from the Legal Defender's file, indicating 
that Margaret Puebla had left word for trial counsel that she would fax something over and 
could be reached at a certain number); Defendant's Exhibits 8 and 22 (Western Union fax 
dated November 1, 2002, reflecting money transfer from Puebla sent to Dominique Nicka 
Hernandez on December 5,2002, which was later refunded oii Decemta i 12,2002); R. 478 
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at 55. 
After the jury convicted Hernandez as charged, trial counsel moved unsuccessfully 
to arrest judgment, alleging insufficiency of the evidence as the sole basis (R. 180-81). 
Despite knowing that he had failed to investigate Hernandez's defense witnesses, he did not 
include any related allegations in his motion in arrest of judgment (R. 478 at 60). 
On October 29, 2002, Judge Barrett issued an order for Qwest to provide phone 
records "listing incoming calls to (307) 332-7973 for customer Margaret Puebla, that 
includes telephone numbers and duration of the call for the time period of December 4,2001 
to December 6, 2001," and on October 31,2002, trial counsel subpoenaed the same records 
(R. 240-241). 
Trial counsel did not file a motion for a new trial. Trial counsel was not familiar with 
the rules governing time for filing motions for a new trial, and was unsure if he had filed one 
(R. 478 at 59). He informed a secretary who questioned him about it that he had filed a 
motion for a new trial four days after the verdict, but was not sure what the difference was 
between a motion in arrest and motion for a new trial (R. 478 at 62). 
After obtaining the phone records, trial counsel did not recognize any value in them, 
because he felt there was too much of a time gap between the two calls and that Hernandez 
could have run over and committed the robbery in between the two calls (R. 478 at 63-64; 
Defendant's Exhibit 16). He did not see how it would be helpful to show that Hernandez was 
waiting for someone to wire him money, and did not find out when Hernandez contacted his 
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grandmother to wire the money, despite the fact that Hernandez had only change on him, and 
no fruits of the robbery, at the time of his arrest (R. 478 at 66). 
Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla have always been willing to testify about 
their phone conversations with Hernandez and about Puebla's sending him a wire on the 
night of the robbery, but were not asked to do so prior to or after trial. See State's Exhibit 
9 (Rule 23B Affidavits of Amanda Hernandez); R. 478 at 107-110, 115-117). 
Despite knowing of this proof of the telephone calls and wire transfer prior to trial, 
and/or prior to the deadline for filing a new trial, trial counsel did not seek to admit the 
evidence at trial or in a motion for a new trial. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel. 
With regard to the defense evidence, the trial court found that Hernandez informed 
trial counsel of relatives who could serve as alibi witnesses, that trial counsel had sufficient 
information to investigate these witnesses prior to trial, but that trial counsel made no 
investigative efforts until after trial (R. 473). 
The trial court indicated that trial counsel's failure to pursue and call Amanda 
Hernandez and Margaret Puebla caused the court great concern because the preliminary 
hearing and trial transcripts reflect that the robbery occurred in a narrow period of time, and 
the defense evidence omitted by trial counsel may have made a significant difference (R. 
474). He noted that Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were significant defense 
witnesses that would have given Hernandez a stronger defense than he presented to the jury, 
and concluded that Hernandez was prejudiced by the failure to investigate and call these 
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witnesses (R. 475).2 
FAILURE TO EXCLUDE HERNANDEZ'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
While trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude Hernandez's statements 
concerning his prior robbery conviction and status as a parolee, and obtained a ruling on the 
motion prior to trial (R. 177-178, R. 254 at 4-5), trial counsel did not address Mr. 
Hernandez's prior criminal history in the motion. He testified that he had no strategic reason 
for failing to include the criminal history in the motion (R. 478 at 68). 
Instead, after the State's case, trial counsel indicated that before deciding if Hernandez 
would testify, he wanted to know if the Hernandez's prior unarmed strong arm robbery 
would be coming into evidence if Hernandez testified (R. 254 at 96). Trial counsel indicated 
that the case law would not permit the prior conviction to come in, especially when the prior 
crime was similar to that charged (R. 254 at 96). The court determined that the prior robbery 
occurred sometime between 1993 and 1998, and said he would probably allow it to come in 
(R. 254 at 96). 
Trial counsel indicated that under State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the 
extreme risk of prejudice should prevent the admission of the prior conviction (R. 254 at 97). 
The court then stated, 
Okay. Let me just tell you where I'm coming from here. 
I think there are several factors required to be looked at in terms of 
2
 A copy of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law is in the 
addendum. 
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whether I allow a conviction such as this strong-arm robbery to come in. I 
think that the closeness in time, the same kind of activity and he's denying that 
he was - I'm assuming he's going to get up and testify that he wasn't there and 
it wasn't him. 
(R. 97). Trial counsel agreed, and the court continued, 
And I don't know that it would necessarily be that highly prejudicial 
since it's a similar conduct as is alleged in this case. So that would probably 
be the basis upon which I would allow Mr. Updegrove to question him about 
that. 
(R. 97). Trial counsel responded, 
Okay. And if I could just, for the record - and I understand your ruling, 
Judge, but I think that the State certainly hasn't - I don't know that they're 
aware of any of the details specifically of that crime. [3] They may have a copy 
of the conviction, but I understand your ruling. 
(R.97). 
The court then granted trial counsel five minutes to consult with Hernandez, and then 
3The record contains a factual description of Hernandez's prior robbery. 
According to the federal presentence report which is included in the pleadings file, 
On December 13, 1997, the defendant and his brother arrived in Cheyenne 
and were involved in a crime spree where vehicles were stolen and property 
was taken from others, sometimes by force. The defendant's brother was to 
steal the purse of an elderly woman and they would cruise through various 
parking lots in Cheyenne. On that afternoon, the defendant's brother 
spotted a woman walking from a grocery store. As she approached her car, 
the defendant jumped from the stolen car and grabbed her purse by way of 
force, causing her to stumble and then jumped back into the car as it sped 
away. The defendant's brother drove to Laramie, Wyoming, where he and 
the defendant used the victim's credit card to purchase clothing at JC 
Penney's. They then stole another vehicle as they made their way out of 
town. The vehicle used in Cheyenne was found in Hanna, Wyoming. 
(R. 189). Mr. Hernandez's testimony confirms that this is an accurate account (R. 478 at 
17). 
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trial counsel informed the court that they had decided that the defense would simply rest 
without putting on any evidence (R. 254 at 98). 
Mr. Hernandez wished to testify in his own behalf, and if he had not been dissuaded 
from doing so by the prospect of having his prior robbery conviction admitted, would have 
testified that he did not commit the robbery (R. 478 at 16-17, 68). He would have testified 
that he was on the phone at the Flying J Truck stop, on a call to his relatives at or near the 
time of the robbery, and was waiting for the money transfer from his grandmother (R. 478 
at 11, 17-18). 
He also established that the officers searched his bag of belongings at the outset of 
their encounter with him (R. 478 at 11-12). 
At the rule 23B hearing, the prosecutor testified that he had no intention whatsoever 
of introducing Hernandez's criminal history in evidence, and was not prepared to impeach 
Hernandez with any prior convictions at trial (R. 478 at 8). He stipulated to trial counsel's 
motion in limine regarding Hernandez's statements regarding his criminal history, and would 
have stipulated to excluding the entire criminal history, had trial counsel sought exclusions 
(R. 478 at 8). He instructed his officers accordingly, and a note in his file indicated, "Do not 
talk about felonies in Wyoming or being on paper," which referred to Hernandez's being on 
parole (R. 478 at 9; Defendant's Exhibit 1). 
Trial counsel testified that he thought it would have made no difference if he had filed 
the motion to exclude the criminal history prior to trial, as opposed to prior to the 
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presentation of the defense case (R. 478 at 82). He did not know the details of Hernandez's 
prior crime (R. 478 at 83). He acknowledged that if he had moved and the prosecutor had 
stipulated prior to trial to complete exclusion of Hernandez's criminal history, that would 
have been better than the ultimate ruling from the trial court, and admitted that if he had filed 
the motion prior to trial, he would not have researched it more than he did (R. 478 at 89). 
He normally did not discover the facts of a prior crime before moving to exclude it (R. 478 
at 90). 
Trial counsel said he normally waited to see how the State's evidence came out before 
deciding whether to call the defendant (R. 478 at 93). 
The trial court acknowledged that trial counsel did not ascertain the facts of the prior 
robbery before trial and that the prosecutor had testified that he had no intention whatsoever 
of introducing Hernandez's criminal record at trial, either as substantive or impeachment 
evidence, and was not prepared to do so (R. 472). The court then reasoned that because the 
prosecutor did not say anything when trial counsel moved to exclude the prior conviction at 
trial, this left a question in the trial court's mind that he may have wanted to admit the 
conviction if Hernandez had testified (R. 472). The trial court found that trial counsel had 
a strategic reason to wait to move to exclude the history, given his practice to see how a trial 
unfolds before deciding whether to call his client as a witness (R. 472). 
The court concluded without explanation that Hernandez was not prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to move to exclude his criminal history prior to trial (R. 473). 
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INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLET 
Trial counsel put Mr. Hernandez's wallet in evidence, along with other personal 
belongings of Hernandez which were seized by the police (R. 254 at 68-71). Unbeknownst 
to counsel, the wallet contained a letter informing Mr. Hernandez of the identity of his 
Wyoming parole/probation officer, two business cards of Wyoming parole/probation officers, 
and one card for a needle exchange program, bearing a participant identification code. See 
Defendant's Exhibit 18; R. 478 at 67. 
The parties stipulated that the plastic bag containing Hernandez's wallet was opened 
during jury deliberations; that juror Scown recalled seeing one business card from a 
Wyoming parole officer in the bag with the wallet; that juror Dangerfield recalled something 
in the wallet indicating that Hernandez was on parole was mentioned to her by another juror 
but not personally seen by her; that juror Walther recalled seeing one business card in the bag 
with the wallet but did not know what it was for; that jurors McGow, Gonzalez, and Lozano 
recall seeing business cards but do not recall what they were for; that jurors Morris and Rigby 
recalled seeing the wallet but did not recall seeing any business cards; and that although 
jurors Dangerfield and Gonzalez recalled seeing somebody open the wallet, none of the 
jurors recalled seeing anything related to Hernandez's parole status, other than as noted 
above (R. 372-74). 
The parties stipulated prior to trial that under Utah R. Evid. 606(b), it would be 
improper to consider the subjective effect of this evidence on the jurors' deliberations (a 
21 
courtesy copy of the stipulation is in the manilla envelope with other pleadings and exhibits). 
The trial court made findings that the bag containing the wallet was opened during 
deliberations, and made other findings fully consistent with the stipulation of the parties 
regarding the juror access to the wallet evidence, and then concluded without explanation 
that Hernandez was not prejudiced (R. 470-72). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The erroneous reasonable doubt instruction constitutes a structural error, which 
requires a new trial. 
The trial court was correct in recognizing that Hernandez received ineffective 
assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's failure to investigate and call the defense 
witnesses. 
Trial counsel's failure to move to exclude Hernandez's criminal history prior to trial 
cannot fairly be characterized as a reasonable trial tactic, given that trial counsel did not 
investigate the bases for excluding the evidence prior to trial, and that the prior conviction 
was not admissible. The failure to move to exclude the evidence prior to trial was 
prejudicial, because the potential admission of the prior criminal history prevented 
Hernandez from testifying, and because the prosecutor would have stipulated to excluding 
the evidence. 
Assuming that trial counsel properly waited to move for the exclusion, he should have 
argued for its exclusion more thoroughly, and the trial court erred in admitting the prior 
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conviction in any event. 
Trial counsel's introduction of Hernandez's wallet was objectively deficient, because 
it informed the jurors of his criminal past, and intimated that he had an illegal drug habit. 
Given the presumption that jurors follow the instructions they are given, that Hernandez's 
jurors were instructed to consider the exhibits in reaching their verdict, that multiple jurors 
were aware of the prejudicial contents of the wallet, and that the unanimous verdict of all the 
jurors was required for Hernandez's conviction to enter, trial counsel's introduction of the 
wallet was prejudicial. 
In failing to move to exclude the unreliable eyewitness identification testimony of 
Nieser, and in failing to move to exclude Hernandez' gun, trial counsel performed in an 
objectively deficient manner. 
Given the reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result in the absence of counsel's 
errors, this Court should grant a new trial. 
Individually, and certainly cumulatively,4 these errors require a new trial. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE ERRONEOUS REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
4
 Under the cumulative error doctrine, the Court will consider all errors, both 
identified and assumed by the Court to have occurred, and will reverse if "'the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines [the Court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was 
had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
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The Due Process Clause in Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and § 76-1-501 of 
the Utah Code require the government to prove each element of a criminal offense beyond 
areasonable doubt. See, State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, % 13,980 P.2d 191. Article I § 12 of 
the Utah Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to have a jury find each element of a 
charged criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction. Lopes, 
1999 UT 24, % 16. Article I § 10 guarantees the criminal defendant's right to a unanimous 
jury verdict as to each element of all criminal offenses. See, State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59 
Tf 61, 992 P.2d 951, 967 (reversing conviction under Article I § 10 for absence of unanimity 
instruction in a case wherein the jurors may have convicted defendant on different factual 
theories, indicating that unanimity is necessary as to each element of an offense). 
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, which applies in all state criminal 
trials by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, is designed to reduce the chance of criminal 
convictions being premised on factual error. Cage v. Louisiana, 438 U.S. 39,39-40 (1990). 
See also. State v. Reves, 2004 UT App 8 f 16, 84 P.3d 841. 
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is also required by the Fifth Amendment, and 
is considered a necessary component of any valid jury verdict under the Sixth Amendment. 
See, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); Reyes, supra. 
ff[T]aken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of 
reasonable doubt to the jury." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); Reyes. 
To satisfy longstanding Utah law, a reasonable doubt instruction must pass a three part 
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test: 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must 
obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should not state that a 
reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or control a person in the more 
weighty affairs of life," as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision 
of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable 
doubt is not merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a 
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds. State v. 
Weeks. 2002 UT 98 f 25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000. 
If jury instructions do not accurately inform the jury regarding the legal definition of 
reasonable doubt, this constitutes a structural error requiring reversal without regard to 
evidentiary prejudice, because if a jury is instructed erroneously on the reasonable doubt 
standard, there is no constitutionally valid jury verdict to which a reviewing court can apply 
harmless error analysis. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279-280. See, also, Reyes; Lopes, supra. 
Denial of the basic protection of the right to a jury verdict premised on an accurate 
understanding of the legal meaning of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard constitutes a 
structural error which defies traditional harmless error analysis, because it is not possible to 
assess the effects of the deprivation of the right. Sullivan at 281-82.5 
Structural errors are those which are exempt to normal harmless error analysis, 
because they do not merely affect the evidentiary balance of a case, but affect the overall 
framework of a trial, and the trial itself from start to finish. See, e.g., Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). Such errors are "necessarily unquantifiable 
and indeterminate," see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 (1993), and thus do not 
lend themselves to an evidence-based harmless error analysis. See, id. 
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Judge Barrett gave the jurors this reasonable doubt instruction copied in the addendum 
to this brief (R. 138). 
Like the reasonable doubt instruction found to constitute structural error in State v. 
Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, the instruction failed to comport with the requirements 
of State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), supra, because the instruction did not 
Structural errors involve "basic protections," in the absence of which "a criminal 
trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, 
and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair." Fulminante, at 307-
09. 
Utah has its own examples of structural error, or situations in which reversal is 
automatic without regard to evidentiary prejudice. For example, in State v. Bennett, 2000 
UT 34, 999 P.2d 1, the court reaffirmed the rule of Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 345 
(Utah 1980), that if a defendant is tried in prison clothing, and the trial court does not 
make a record of the circumstances justifying the defendant's attire, automatic reversal is 
required. E.g. Bennett at ^ j 3-4, 7. 
The court based the Chess automatic reversal rule on the fact that the right not to 
appear in prison clothing is a fundamental one, essential to the presumption of innocence 
and to having the verdict based on the evidence, rather than on prejudice. Chess, 617 
P.2d at 344-345. The court recognized that the per se reversal rule was necessary because 
trying a defendant in prison clothes is fundamentally unfair, and because the prejudice 
flowing from trial in prison clothes could not be measured with a traditional analysis of 
evidentiary prejudice. See id. 
In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the court held that automatic reversal 
is warranted if appointed defense counsel also acts as a prosecutor in same county. Id. at 
859. The court'sper se reversal requirement in this context was based on conscious and 
subconscious conflicts that a lawyer would feel while filling these dual roles, which might 
impede his performance as defense counsel, and on the likelihood that defendants would 
be reticent to confide in defense counsel also serving as a prosecutor. The court also 
required per se reversal because the dual service "creates an appearance of impropriety 
which diminishes public confidence in the criminal justice system." Id. at 857-58. 
Utah law also requires automatic reversal for violations of the right to a public 
trial, see, e.g.. State v. Jordan, 196 P. 565, 568 (Utah 1921); and for the absence of 
accurate elements instructions, see, e.g.. State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980). 
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contain the essential phrase "'proof beyond reasonable doubt obviates all reasonable doubt'" 
and did contain the impermissible language indicating that reasonable doubt is not one that 
is merely possible. Compare R. 398, supra, with Reyes, at f 11. 
Given the dubious nature of the State's case against Hernandez, a case hinging on 
unreliable eyewitness testimony, wherein Hernandez was arrested shortly after the robbery 
without the victim's money or wallet, the State could not prove the constitutional error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the event that harmless error analysis applied. See, 
Statement of Facts, supra. 
Because there is no constitutionally valid conviction upon which to apply harmless 
error analysis, and because the evidentiary prejudice stemming from the erroneous reasonable 
doubt instruction cannot accurately be assessed, the error constitutes a structural one, 
requiring reversal. See, Sullivan; Reyes; and Lopes, supra. 
To the degree that trial counsel did not preserve the issue discussed above, this Court 
should nonetheless address and correct the error under the exceptional circumstances, plain 
error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare 
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 23, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
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occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong 
may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight 
than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35 and n.8 
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate 
for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 
1138, 1140 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I § 12, Hernandez must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below 
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient 
performance was prejudicial. See e ^ Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert. 
denied 513 U.S. 966(1994). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e ^ , State v. Smedlev, 2003 UT App 79 at f 10,67 P.3d 1005. 
When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial law and seek accurate jury instructions based 
on the current law, this constitutes objectively deficient performance, which will not be 
excused by this Court with hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 
692 (Utah App. 1989) (trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law 
beneficial to the client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not 
conceivably have been valid trial strategy). 
The jury instructions were not snap decisions that were made in the heat of battle with 
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the jury present, but could and should have been researched and studied well in advance of 
this serious first degree felony trial. 
Accurate reasonable doubt instructions are a fundamental cornerstone of every 
criminal case. See, e ^ , State v. Reves, 2004 UT App 81J16, 84 P.3d 841. 
State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219,1232(Utah 1997), which set forth the unique three 
part test for Utah reasonable doubt instructions, and the case upon which it was premised, 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), were both published years before this trial. 
Just as the lower court should have followed the controlling law, the trial lawyer had 
the duty to assert the law and issues on Hernandez's behalf, and counsel's failure to object 
to the plain errors constituted objectively deficient performance. See, e.g., Smedley; 
Moritzsky, supra. 
Assuming arguendo that the error discussed above were not viewed as plain, this 
Court has the authority to recognize highly prejudicial errors, which are better understood in 
hindsight than they were at the time of trial, see, e ^ , Eldredge, supra, and should do so in 
this case because the error was so prejudicial. 
Hernandez was structurally and fundamentally prejudiced by the erroneous jury 
instruction on reasonable doubt, because the instruction deprived him of a constitutionally 
valid and unanimous jury verdict finding each element of the offense of conviction proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a case hinging on questionable eye-witness identification 
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testimony, and undermined by the fact that Hernandez did not have the fruits of the robbery 
(over $700) at the time of his arrest, when he was found waiting at the Flying J Truck Stop, 
waiting for a $45 wire transfer from his grandmother. 
Such critical and fundamental procedural errors, which do not lend themselves to 
traditional harmless error analysis, see, Sullivan, supra, qualify for treatment under the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine. See, State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^ | 23,497 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving 
"'rare procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice). 
II. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE 
Every criminal defendant has several related federal constitutional rights to present 
a complete defense to criminal charges against him. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 
(1985)(" Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
or in the Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the 
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants fa meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense.1... We break no new ground in observing that an essential component of procedural 
fairness is an opportunity to be heard.")(citations omitted). 
The Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential element of due 
process provided by article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to 
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submit evidence." Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314,317 (Utah 1945). "[T]he defendant's 
right to present all competent evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed by the due process 
clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.]" State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 
1981). Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides numerous trial rights which 
also pertain. It states, 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 similarly provides, 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf[.] 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a trial lawyer's failure to investigate 
potential defense witnesses constitutes clearly deficient performance and cannot be 
considered a legitimate tactical decision. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188-189 (Utah 
1990). 
As the court in Templin recognized, the appellate court need not speculate as to how 
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a jury might have assessed the credibility of defense witnesses that trial counsel failed to 
investigate. If the proffer of their testimony establishes prejudice, ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel is established. Id. at 188-189. 
In the instant matter, Hernandez's aunt, Amanda Hernandez, has always been willing 
to testify that on the night of December 5, 2001, she was talking on the phone with 
Hernandez from approximately 6:22 p.m. to 6:29 p.m., and there are phone records verifying 
that someone at the Flying J Truck stop was on the phone with someone at her house at this 
time. See Statement of Facts, supra. This evidence, placing Hernandez at the Flying J at or 
near the time when the robbery occurred,6 was strongly corroborative of his defense, that he 
was at the Flying J when the robbery happened, and that Nieser was mistaken in identifying 
him as the robber. 
Hernandez's grandmother has always been willing to testify that Hernandez called her 
on the evening of December 5,2001, and asked her to send him a wire transfer, and there are 
phone records confirming that someone at the Flying J was on the phone with someone at her 
house at 6:53 on December 5,2001. There are also records verifying that she sent a Western 
Union money transfer to Hernandez in the amount of $45 on the night of the robbery. 
See Statement of Facts, supra. This evidence was also strongly corroborative of Hernandez's 
6
 Dispatch broadcast Nieser's complaint to the police at 6:39 (R. 254 at 49-52). 
According to Nieser's preliminary hearing and trial testimony, the robbery began at about 
6:30 and lasted four to five minutes, and he waited between five and ten minutes before 
he went inside to report it (R. 254 at 12-15, 19-20, R. 253 at 5). Subtracting the nine to 
fourteen minutes the robbery and recovery period took up from the dispatch time of 6:39 leads to 
the conclusion that the robbery began between and 6:25 and 6:30. 
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defense, and of what Hernandez told the police, that on the night of December 5, he did not 
rob Nieser of over $700, but was at the Flying J Truck stop waiting for a Western Union 
telegram. 
If Mr. Hernandez got off the phone with his aunt at 6:29, and ran blocks in one minute 
to commit a robbery at the Freeway Transmission at 6:30, wherein he took over $700, why 
was he back at the Flying J at 6:53 without the over $700 and calling his grandmother to wire 
him $45? 
Where the only evidence connecting Hernandez to the robbery was the unreliable 
eyewitness identification testimony of Nieser, where Hernandez did not match the robber's 
description, and where Hernandez was seized by the police about thirty minutes after the 
robbery and did not have the $700 plus dollars taken in the robbeiy, evidence confirming that 
he was at the Flying J up to a minute before the robbery happened, and waiting around the 
Flying J to get $45 shortly after the robbery, as he told the police, could easily have made 
the difference between a verdict of guilty and a verdict of not guilty. Cf. State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in 
part because counsel failed to call witnesses to bolster the defendants testimony). 
Trial counsel had no strategic reason for failing to prepare for trial, Templin, or for 
failing to move for a continuance to facilitate trial preparation, see Rule 23B Affidavit of 
Trial Counsel. 
Trial counsel should have investigated this evidence prior to trial, and moved to 
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continue the trial until he was prepared to try the case. See Templin, supra. 
At a minimum, once trial counsel realized after the trial that the evidence needed for 
Hernandez's defense was wholly neglected to be presented at trial, counsel should have 
moved the trial court to order a new trial on the basis of his own ineffective assistance, or 
should have conflicted off the case to permit conflict counsel to do so under Utah R. Crim. 
P. 24(b) and (c). Compare Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211, 221 (Utah)(noting that Utah 
attorneys had historically complied with their ethical obligations to argue their own 
ineffective assistance), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994); with State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 
900, 907 (Utah App.)(counsel should consider withdrawing from case so alternate counsel 
can pursue claims of ineffective assistance), reversed on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 
1996). Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and present necessary 
defense witnesses is a proper basis for granting a new trial. See generally Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990)(reversing trial court's denial of motion for new trial, which was filed by 
new counsel, who alleged that trial counsel's failure to investigate and present necessary 
defense witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Because the trial court was correct in finding that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance, this Court should order a new trial. 
B. FAILURE TO EXCLUDE HERNANDEZ'S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
On of the most fundamental criminal defense rights provided by our constitutions and 
code is the defendant's right to testify. See, e.g.. Crane v. Kentucky: Harding; Christiansen; 
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and Utah Code Ann. § 77-1 -6, supra. In the instant case, Mr. Hernandez did not exercise this 
right, as a result of trial counsel's deficient performance. 
Trial counsel filed a motion in limine prior to trial, and obtained a ruling thereon (R. 
177-178, R. 254 at 4-5), but failed to address Mr. Hernandez's criminal history in the motion 
in limine. After the State rested, trial counsel obtained a ruling from the trial court that if 
Hernandez testified, his prior robbery would likely come in as impeachment evidence (R. 254 
at 96). Based on this ruling, trial counsel and Hernandez conferred and decided Hernandez 
would not testify (R. 254 at 96, 98). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 (b)(2) requires motions to suppress evidence to 
be filed five days prior to trial. While trial courts have the discretion to grant untimely 
motions, e ^ Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d), in raising issues orally in the trial 
courts, trial attorneys must be thorough in making clear and specific objections. See State 
v. Smedlev. 2003 WL 1343285, 2003 UT App 79 at f 10, supra. 
In the instant matter, trial counsel did not provide the trial court with a factual 
description of Hernandez's prior robbery at the time he moved to suppress it, but only alluded 
to the possibility that the prosecution may not have known the facts underlying the prior 
robbery (R. 254 at 96). 
The record contains a factual description of Hernandez's prior robbery. According 
to the federal presentence report which is included in the pleadings file, and was apparently 
faxed to trial counsel the day after the conviction (R. 183), 
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On December 13,1997, the defendant and his brother arrived in Cheyenne and 
were involved in a crime spree where vehicles were stolen and property was 
taken from others, sometimes by force. The defendant's brother was to steal 
the purse of an elderly woman and they would cruise through various parking 
lots in Cheyenne. On that afternoon, the defendant's brother spotted a woman 
walking from a grocery store. As she approached her car, the defendant 
jumped from the stolen car and grabbed her purse by way of force, causing her 
to stumble and then jumped back into the car as it sped away. The defendant's 
brother drove to Laramie, Wyoming, where he and the defendant used the 
victim's credit card to purchase clothing at JC Penney's. They then stole 
another vehicle as they made their way out of town. The vehicle used in 
Cheyenne was found in Hanna, Wyoming. 
(R. 189). Mr. Hernandez's testimony confirms that these facts are accurate (T. 478 at 17). 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 609, the prior robbery conviction would not have been 
admissible to impeach Hernandez in the event that he testified, because robberies are not 
considered crimen falsi, and the facts of the prior robbery do not involve deception. See, 
e.g.. State v. Wight 765 P.2d 12, 17-19 (Utah App. 1988). 
Contrary to the trial court's rationale that the jurors would be less likely to be 
prejudiced by the prior crime because it was the same as the offense charged (R. 254 at 97), 
the fact that the prior crime was a robbery, the same offense charged here, weighed heavily 
against its admission under the criteria set forth in State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 
(Utah 1986): 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character for veracity of the 
witness. 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction.... 
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, insofar as a close 
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person. 
[4] the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in a 
prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence.... 
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[5] the importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the 
exclusion of convictions probative of the accused's character for veracity. 
Applying the Banner analysis correctly confirms that Hernandez's prior robbery 
conviction should have been excluded prior to trial. The nature of the crime did not bear on 
Hernandez's character for veracity. The prior crime happened on December 13,1997, nearly 
four years before the Nieser robbery on December 5,2001 (R. 254 at 12-13). While the facts 
of the two robberies were quite disparate, the fact that the offenses were both robberies 
weighed heavily against admission because of the likelihood that the jurors would convict 
in this case on a theory of criminal propensity. See Banner at 1334, n.44 ('"Consideration 
of the testimony's prejudicial effect is especially pertinent when the witness is the defendant 
in a criminal prosecution or a party in a civil case. This is particularly important when, as 
here, the prior conviction is for the same type of crime involved in the matter under present 
consideration. In this type of situation, the probative value of the evidence as affecting the 
party's credibility will rarely outweigh the resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and 
the prejudice to the party, "'Xcitation omitted; emphasis by the Banner court). 
In this case, there was no dispositive non-testimonial evidence. Hernandez was found 
within half an hour of the robbery without the fruits of the robbery, and did not match the 
description of the robber. The only thing tying him to the crime was the unreliable 
eyewitness testimony of Nieser, who made numerous inconsistent statements about the 
description of the robber. 
The need for Hernandez's testimony was critical in this case, so the jurors could hear 
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him deny having committed the robbery, see him face the prosecutor's cross-examination, 
and have the opportunity to hear him speak and confirm that he did not sound or look 
Hispanic, as Nieser said the robber was. 
The prior robbery would not have been otherwise admissible under Rules of Evidence 
401 through 404, because there was no legitimate non-character purpose for admitting the 
prior robbery, and it was therefore inadmissible. See, e.g.. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, fflf 
21-23, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000) (prior bad act evidence is 
admissible only if there is a proper-non-character purpose for the evidence, if the evidence 
is relevant to a material fact, and if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by its potential for prejudice). 
The only issue for the jurors to determine in this case was the identity of the robber. 
Under well established Utah law, prior bad acts are not admissible to show identity unless 
they bear numerous unique factual similarities to the charged offense, and are so similar to 
the charged offense as to be fairly compared as "signature-like" in quality. See State v. 
Decorso, at ffif 2, 7-12, 27; State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238 at ffif 32-35, 32 P.3d 976 at 
986-87. 
The prior robbery, involving Hernandez driving by as a passenger in a car and 
snatching a purse, bore no "signature like" qualities with the charged armed robbery, and thus 
would only have proved criminal propensity, not identity. Cf. Decorso, supra (detailing 
numerous factual parallels between crime charged and extrinsic crimes properly admitted to 
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prove identity); and Webster (holding that prior car theft was factually too different from 
charged car theft to be admitted to prove identity). 
Because the extrinsic crimes evidence in this case went more to propensity than it did 
to the true facts in issue, it was not admissible under rules of evidence 404. See Decorso. 
supra. 
Because the admission of the prior robbery would have posed a strong likelihood that 
the jurors would convict Hernandez on an inference of criminal propensity, its prejudicial 
value substantially outweighed the negligible probative value of the evidence. Exclusion was 
therefore in order under rule 403. See Decorso. supra. 
Particularly because the admission of the prior crime would have jeopardized 
Hernandez's constitutional rights to a fair trial, it should not have been admitted. See 
generally, e.g.. State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59 at ^ 15, 992 P.2d 951, 957. 
Trial counsel's failure to properly present this issue prior to trial with appropriate 
briefing prior to trial, or to properly argue the matter under the relevant facts and governing 
law constituted objectively deficient performance, and could not have been a valid tactical 
decision, given that trial counsel did not even know the underlying facts of the robbery 
before making his motion at the end of the State's case. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
But see, e.g.. Templin. supra (requiring trial counsel to investigate defense case). 
Mr. Hernandez wished to testify in his own defense, and it was trial counsel's opinion 
that it would have been in Mr. Hernandez's interest to do so, because his demeanor is 
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credible and watching him testify would have helped the jurors distinguish Hernandez from 
the robber described by Nieser. See Defendant's Exhibit 17 (Rule 23B Affidavits of Trial 
Counsel). 
Particularly given that the prosecutor would have stipulated to the exclusion of the 
conviction, trial counsel's failure to move for the exclusion in timely fashion was prejudicial. 
See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Assuming that trial counsel properly waited to move for the exclusion, the trial court 
erred in admitting the prior conviction under the governing law explained above, and the 
ruling was prejudicial, because it prevented Hernandez from exercising his right to testify in 
a case wherein his testimony may have made the critical difference. 
Unfortunately, any benefit to be gained by exchanging Mr. Hernandez's right to testify 
for protecting the jury from knowing about Hernandez's criminal past was more than 
cancelled out by the trial counsel's provision of Hernandez's wallet in evidence. 
C. INTRODUCTION OF THE WALLET 
Despite forfeiting Hernandez's right to testify in order to avoid informing the jury of 
Hernandez's prior bad acts, trial counsel offered into evidence Mr. Hernandez's wallet (R. 
254 at 68-71). Unbeknownst to trial counsel, the wallet contained a letter informing Mr. 
Hernandez of the identity of his Wyoming parole/probation officer, two business cards of 
Wyoming parole/probation officers, and one card for a needle exchange program, bearing 
a participant identification code. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
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It is generally presumed that jurors follow the instructions courts give them, see, e.g.. 
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1115 (1995), and in this 
case, the trial court instructed the jurors to "consider and weigh the evidence introduced" (R. 
125), to base their verdict on the evidence (R. 126), to consider exhibits as evidence (R. 129), 
to reach a verdict "solely after considering the evidence that has been received during the 
trial" (R. 134), and to "carefully and conscientiously consider and compare all of... the facts 
and circumstances," (R. 142). Finally, the jurors were instructed, 
Each of you, as jurors, after considering all the evidence in the case, must 
determine the defendant's innocence or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(R. 157). 
The trial court's findings accurately reflect that multiple jurors were aware of the 
contents of Hernandez's wallet and that at least one of the jurors inferred from the contents 
that Hernandez was on parole. Given the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in this 
State, Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10, the one prejudiced juror could have made the 
difference. 
Trial counsel's mistakenly informing the jurors of Hernandez's criminal activities by 
informing them that he was either on parole or probation, and that he was also carrying a 
needle exchange program participant card, without giving the jurors any legal instructions 
for a proper application of such evidence, virtually guaranteed that the jurors would convict 
Hernandez on a theory of criminal propensity. But see, e.g., Saunders, DeCorso, supra. 
The government's case was a highly suspect eyewitness identification case. Had the 
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jurors had the opportunity to hear and see Hernandez testify, and/or been protected from the 
tainting effects of the contents of Hernandez's wallet, there is a reasonable probability of a 
different result. See State v. Gallegos 967 P.2d 973,976 (Utah 1998)(trial counsel's failure 
to renew suppression motion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel) and State v. 
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993)(reversing two convictions for lewdness involving 
a child because trial counsel failed to timely file motion to suppress statements taken in 
violation of Miranda). 
D. FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FROM UNLAWFUL SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES 
As is detailed in the Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel which was admitted at the 
23B hearing, trial counsel did not file motions to suppress Mr. Hernandez's gun, statements 
to the police or eyewitness identifications, and had no strategic reason for abstaining from 
filing such motions. 
A motion to suppress should have been filed to address the police violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, as established herein. 
Where a police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or 
other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and 
dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the 
individual to discover weapons that might be used against him. 
State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985). 
At the time of the lower court proceedings in this case, basic Fourth Amendment law 
required proof of one of two factual bases to justify a Terry frisk: 
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In the first, facts and circumstances unique to the particular suspect and/or 
factual context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion the suspect may be 
armed, such as a suspect with a bulge in his clothing that appears to be a 
weapon or a suspect who is hesitant in denying that he is armed and 
aggressively approaches the officer immediately upon being stopped. In the 
second scenario, it is not so much the peculiarities of the suspect and 
circumstances as it is the inherent nature of the crime being investigated that 
leads to the reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed. 
State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346 at j^ 15, 37 P.3d 270, 273 (citation omitted). 
In the instant matter, there were no facts in the preliminary hearing or trial that 
indicated that Hernandez was behaving in a suspicious or dangerous manner in his dealings 
with the investigating officers. Rather, he was fully cooperative. 
While armed robbery is inherently one leading to a reasonable suspicion that the 
perpetrator would be armed, Warren, the law requires that a suspect "substantially match" 
the assailant's description in order to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is the 
assailant. See, e.g., Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 953 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). In this case, Hernandez did not substantially match the suspect's 
description. 
Nieser consistently described the robber as appearing Hispanic (R. 253 at 5, 8). The 
arresting officer conceded that Hernandez does not appear Hispanic, but looks Caucasian (R. 
253 at 22). 
Nieser told dispatch that the robber was five feet eight inches to five feet ten inches 
tall, and weighed about one hundred and sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22, 38). Hernandez is 
five feet four inches tall, and a week after his arrest, Hernandez weighed one hundred and 
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forty five pounds (R. 254 at 75). 
Nieser told dispatch that the robber was wearing a blue shirt, but the shirt that was 
visible on Hernandez when the police frisked him was black (R. 254 at 26, 41, 52-53). 
Nieser maintained that the robber ran Eastbound (R. 253 at 4). Hernandez was located 
at the Flying J Truck stop, Southbound from the robbery (R. 253 at 12-16). In any event, 
one's mere proximity to the scene of a crime does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
participation in that crime. See, e.g.. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987); State 
v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986). 
When the police initially approached Hernandez and prior to their announcement of 
their intent to frisk him, Hernandez was fully cooperative, following the police out of the 
television lounge into the hallway, explaining what he was doing at the Flying J, and telling 
them without any described nervousness or suspiciousness that he had no gun (R. 254 at 56-
57). 
On these facts, the police had no reasonable suspicion that Hernandez was the robber 
to justify a frisk of Hernandez, and all fruits resulting from the unlawful frisk, including 
Hernandez's gun and statements and subsequent identification, should have been suppressed. 
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)(evidence derived from illegal 
searches and seizures should be suppressed).7 The relevant test under Wong Sun is 
7
 In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Court stated, 
The "body" or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or 
civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, 
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'" whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'" 371 U.S. at 487-88 (citation 
omitted). 
As the affidavit of trial counsel confirms, trial counsel did not consider filing a motion 
to suppress Mr. Hernandez's gun and statements to the police, and considered but did not file 
a motion to suppress the eyewitness identification of Hernandez, and had no strategic basis 
for failing to do so. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel. 
When there is no conceivable strategic basis for failing to pursue motions, objectively 
even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation 
occurred. See Gerstein v. Push, 420 U.S. 103. 119(1975): Frisbie v. 
Collins. 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); United States ex rel. Bilokumskv v. 
Tod. [263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923)]. 
Id. at 1039-40. 
While some courts have interpreted this dicta as an indication that no evidence 
bearing on the defendant's identity may be suppressed, see e,g. United States v. Guzman-
Bruno. 27 F.3d 420 (9th Cir.). cert, denied. 513 U.S. 975 (1994), these decisions are 
poorly reasoned and fail to recognize that this portion of Lopez-Mendoza. like the three 
cases it cites, stands for the unremarkable proposition that a criminal defendant is not 
immune from criminal prosecution merely because his arrest was illegal. 
Consistent with such precedents as Hayes v. Florida. 470 U.S. 811 
(1985)(fingerprints obtained by illegal detention should have been suppressed); and Davis 
v. Mississippi. 394 U.S. 721 (1969)(same); the Tenth Circuit has recognized that evidence 
bearing on identity is subject to suppression. See United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 
1068 (10th Cir.)(defendant's concession of his identity should have been suppressed 
under Miranda, but error was harmless), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 1026 (1993); United States 
v. Alarcon-Gonzales, 73 F.3d 289 (10th Cir. 1996) (defendant motion to suppress 
following his statement of his name and remarks concerning origin and immigration 
status and subsequent INS investigation should have been suppressed because they were 
the product of an illegal detention). 
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deficient performance is established. See, Gallegos, and Snyder, supra. 
There is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had the motion been filed, 
because the motion had merit, and if the government would not have had the gun, Mr. 
Hernandez's statements, and the eyewitness identification of Hernandez as the robber, the 
government would have had no case. See Gallegos and Snyder, supra. 
E. FAILURE TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY 
As noted above, trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress Hernandez's eyewitness 
identification, and had no strategic reason for this failure. Thus, he failed to call upon the 
prosecution to meet its burden to establish the reliability of the identification, and failed to 
call upon trial court to exercise his gatekeeping function, mandated by Article I § 7 of the 
Utah Constitution, to scrutinize eyewitness identification testimony to insure that jurors were 
not unduly influenced by unreliable evidence. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778-79 
(Utah 1991)(establishing unique trial court role in excluding unreliable eyewitness 
identification testimony). 
Such a motion would have had merit under the governing law. 
The relevant factors for courts to consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications are set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), as follow: 
"(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
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suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood 
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly." 
Id. at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
The Ramirez Court explained the analysis as follows: 
The fourth reliability factor is whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or whether it was a 
product of suggestion. Here, relevant circumstances include the length of time 
that passed between the witness's observation at the time of the event and the 
identification of defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at 
the time of the identification; the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions, 
identifications, or other information from other sources; instances when the 
witness or other eyewitnesses to the event failed to identify defendant; 
instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the 
actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the circumstances under which 
defendant was presented to the witness for identification. 
Id. at 783 (citations omitted). 
In the instant matter, the robbery took place when it was dark (R. 253 at 8,14, R. 254 
at 34). Nieser was either staring down the barrel of the gun (R. 254 at 34-35) or noticing the 
assailant's clothes (R. 254 at 21). Nieser had suffered from two heart attacks the year before 
the robbery, and at the time of the robbery was very stressed with "sky high" blood pressure 
and concern that he was going to have another heart attack (R. 253 at 1-2, 8, R. 254 at 19-20, 
36). Nieser's descriptions of the assailant varied over time, and did not match Hernandez.8 
8
 Nieser told dispatch that the robber was a male Hispanic, about twenty years old, 
five feet eight inches tall or five feet ten inches tall and weighing about one hundred and 
sixty pounds (R. 254 at 21-22, 38). 
At the preliminary hearing, he said the robber was about the same height as Nieser, 
5'7" or 5'8", and weighed 130 to 140 pounds (R. 253 at 5, 12). 
At trial, Nieser testified he was wearing one inch heels during the robbery, and had 
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Nieser's ultimate identification of Hernandez occurred when Hernandez was 
presented alone, in a show-up, wherein he was handcuffed and spotlighted by the police, 
testified at the preliminary hearing that the robber was his height, 57" or 5f8" (R. 254 at 
31, 37-38), but could not recall having told the dispatcher that the robber's height was 
between 5f8M and 5'10" (R. 254 at 38). The robber was just over an arm's length away 
from him, and he stared at him for several minutes and believed the person was the same 
height as he is (R. 254 at 46). 
Hernandez is 5f4" (R. 254 at 75). 
At the preliminary hearing, Nieser testified that the robber wore a blue shirt with 
writing across the side or front of it in letters three to four inches tall (R. 253 at 5, 10). 
At trial, Nieser maintained that the writing was across the front of the shirt, and that the 
preliminary hearing transcript was wrong to indicate that he ever said it was across the 
side (R. 254 at 42). 
Officer Brede testified that the dispatch operator indicated that the robber was 
wearing white athletic shoes (R. 253 at 21), contrary to Nieser's preliminary hearing 
testimony that he did not notice the robber's shoes or provide a shoe description to the 
police (R. 253 at 13). At trial, Nieser testified that the robber was wearing white tennis 
shoes (R. 254 at 23). Nieser did not remember having had no recall of shoes at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 254 at 39). He remembered telling dispatch about the shoes, but 
later may have forgotten that detail (R. 254 at 39). 
Nieser acknowledged at trial that at the preliminary hearing, he had testified that 
he thought the robber was Hispanic because of his goatee and hairdo, and also recalled 
denying that a certain hairdo and goatee meant a person was Hispanic (R. 254 at 44). He 
did not recall having said that he thought the suspect was Hispanic because his heart rate 
was up and it was dark at Freeway Transmission (R. 254 at 44), but that was indeed his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing (R. 253 at 8). When defense counsel alluded to 
Nieser's preliminary hearing testimony regarding why the robber looked Hispanic and 
asked him why he did, Nieser testified, "I don't know, he just did. He looked Hispanic to 
me." (R. 254 at 37). 
He did not tell dispatch about scarring or jewelry, but Hernandez' forehead was 
scarred, and he had an earing in his left ear on the night of his arrest (R. 254 at 45). 
The dispatch report originating from Nieser indicated that the robber's gun was 
black (R. 254 at 74). At the preliminary hearing, he described the gun as grey with some 
silver or chrome on it (R. 253 at 1-3, 9). At trial, he identified the gun the police seized 
from Hernandez as the robber's gun, despite the fact that the gun is not black and has no 
silver or chrome (R. 254 at 34-35). 
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about a half hour after the robbery (R. 235 at 7; R. 254 at 24, 39, 57, 76). 
The most telling fact about the suggestiveness of the show-up was Nieser's memory 
of what preceded it. He testified that he saw the police driving around the neighborhood of 
Freeway Transmission within a couple of minutes of his call, and they stopped about five 
minutes later (R. 254 at 36). Detective Wallace and another officer came and got him about 
half an hour after the robbery and told him they "had a suspect that fit the description and 
wanted to know if [Nieser] could ID him." (R. 254 at 23-24, 44). 
Given these facts, the prosecution should have been put to its burden to demonstrate 
that Nieser's identification of Hernandez was reliable, and the trial court should have been 
called upon to perform his gatekeeping function, to screen out unreliable eyewitness 
identification testimony. See Ramirez, supra. 
There was, and could have been, no legitimate trial strategy to abstain from 
challenging Nieser's unreliable eyewitness identification of Hernandez, and the failure to 
pursue this in the trial court constituted objectively deficient performance. See Smedley, 
Gallegos, and Snyder, supra. 
There is a reasonable likelihood of a different result here, given that the police found 
no money and no property of the victim on Hernandez, that Hernandez did not match the 
robber's description, and that Hernandez's gun did not match Nieser's descriptions of the 
robber's gun. 
In State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999), the court reversed eight counts of 
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aggravated robbery because the case hinged on shaky eye-witness identification testimony, 
and yet trial counsel there failed to request a jury instruction cautioning the jurors on the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony, and failed to challenge police testimony 
bolstering the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony which was lacking proper 
foundation. See kL at 3 80-81. 
Comparison of the facts of this case with those in Maestas demonstrates how 
Hernandez was prejudiced by trial counsel's errors. See, id. at 381-82 (finding prejudicial 
error where trial counsel failed to request cautionary instruction when mistaken identification 
was the heart of the defense, and where other evidence sustaining the verdict was 
inconclusive). 
In the instant matter, Mr. Hernandez's defense was that he was not the robber. When 
the police approached him half an hour after the robbery, he went with them willingly and 
spoke with them after Miranda, consistently maintaining his innocence. He did not have the 
money from the robbery, or any of the victim's property. The eyewitness identification was 
subject to suppression altogether in this case. Thus, the failure of trial counsel to wholly 
avoid the harm of unreliable eyewitness identification evidence in this case by moving to 
suppress it was even more prejudicial than it was in Maestas. See id. 
Conclusion 
This Court should reverse Hernandez's conviction and order a new trial. 
DATED this June 23, 2004. 
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i. Hernandez 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be mailed first class postage prepaid, one true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 160 East 300 
South, PO Box 140812, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812, this June 23, 2004. 
51 
ADDENDUM 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
All presumptions ^f ..laepLaaeh - Vf 
. i J t: in Lavuj I i 1111' n '< -i ;• •• "i: or l.i ;• oresumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable' 
doubt Where you are satisfied * uci*" ^ ^easonabl> 
CLOUD, LXib, . ! < , • 
The burden is upo- : he prosecution to prove the 
defendant guilty £>ey olid a reasonai-1 *. J... .>.. 
s
 * • '• an absolute 
certainty. Reasonable doubt is required, not ioubt which 
• merely possible, since everything *•.• uiman affairs i s 
o p e n l i J MJiiti. puhi-j J Li I i i nil i<) i 11- II i
 ( i li ii il 'I . I'" i i >nf hr \r\ u H i 
a reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that satisfies 
your mind and convinces your ^onscientiors understanding. 
Reasonabl. i: ea soi :i a 1: •] e i m: i = .] i 
; ; women and arises from the evidence, or lack . t. 
e v i d e nee, i i I t: h e case. 
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TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
• " ' - ' MUTH F HINT (Wo?) 
: . j x 9 4 l y 
SAI T LAKE CITY, I >TAH 84109-04IV 
Telephone: (801)706-
ATTORNEY FOR MR. HERNANDEZ 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY DiiPARTIMEN I, IN \ND l'< M< S M I I AKL COUNTY 
STATE O U T Ml 
STATE Ol HI Ml Finding.-ol ia_, ami 
: Conclusions of Law 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, on 23 B Remand 
v. 
l)<>MINK,)!!l I' HERN AND! / . 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. Judge William W. Barrett 
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded this matter to this Court for the entry of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on several issues. 
!
 :\ mg conducted a full evidentiary hearing and having reviewed the transcript of 
that hearing and the exhibits admitted therein, this Court hereby enters the following 
findings of fact regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Findings m • «v.i 
1. The evidence is insufficient to determine whether the letter or business 
riLU'H 
03 DEC 10 PM 2=05 
SA'J" LAKE DEPARTHEH1 
0EPUTY CLERK 
cards of Hernandez's parole officer were visible outside the wallet while inside an 
evidence bag submitted to the jury. 
2. The plastic bag containing the wallet was opened during the deliberations 
3. The stipulation entered into by the parties accurately reflects what the Court 
finds regarding the jurors' awareness of the contents of the wallet. Specifically, 
a. Juror Michael Scown recalled seeing one business card in the 
plastic bag with the wallet and recalls that the business card was the card of 
a Wyoming parole officer. 
b. Juror Cheiyl Dangerfield recalled that another juror 
commented to her that something in the wallet indicated that defendant was 
on parole. Ms. Dangerfield recalled that she did not personally see the item. 
c. Juror Rebecca Walther recalled seeing one business card in 
the bag with the wallet but did not recall what the business card was for. 
d. Jurors Julie McGow, Rafael Gonzalez, and Jose Lozano 
recalled seeing business cards but did not recall what they were for. 
e. Jurors James Morris and Bea Rigby recall seeing the wallet 
but do not recall seeing any business cards. 
f. Although jurors Cheryl Dangerfield and Rafael Gonzalez 
recall seeing somebody open the wallet, none of the jurors recall seeing 
anything related to defendant's parole other than as outlined above. 
2 
Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that Hernandez suffered no 
prejudice from trial counsel's admission of the wallet. 
5. I he laa:> oi l lanandcz prior strong-arm robbery are as testing, .,- . \-
brother in a car, that they pulled into a supermarket in nwd of gas money and other 
things, that Hernandez jumped out of a car and took a woman's purse from hei that 
Hei nandez got ba> :k iri.t :) tl le cai ai id that 1:1: i. z] n lsed the money. 
6. Defendant's trial counsel did not ascertain the factual details of the strong-
arm robbery prior to {he trial in this case,, 
7. ' i . . . ..u p iuSL^i :o i testified ai m e ruie - ;> i;ut mg w.„. .,* . .^. to 
intei iti :: it i \ 1: !i,a;tsoei ei of i nti ocliii ni|> Hunan i* 
substantive or impeachment evidence, and was not prepared to do so. 
!. I lowever, given that the prosecutor did not sa> ai lything when trial counsel 
asked the Court at the close of the State's case regarding the admissibility of the prior 
very well have wanted to bring in that strong-arm robbeiy conviction had Hernandez 
testified. 
9. Diicmi.iin :> liuii counsel ,. . . , .uiak^K .^asoii L, wait to move to exclude 
before deciding whether a defendant's testimony will be required. 
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10. Hernandez was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file a motion in 
limine seeking to exclude his strong arm robbery conviction prior to trial. 
11. Prior to trial, Hernandez informed trial counsel of relatives who could serve 
as alibi witnesses. 
12. While defendant's trial counsel may not have been told the specific names 
and contact information for Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla until after trial, trial 
counsel had enough information before trial to investigate these witnesses. 
13. Trial counsel made no efforts to locate and interview these witnesses until 
after trial 
14. Amanda Hernandez would have come to the trial and testified as follows: 
a. That items 2 through 6 on page 7 of her telephone bill evidence five 
telephone calls to her from payphones in Washington and Utah between the period of 
December 1 and December 5, 2001, and that she believes that all those calls were from 
defendant. 
b. That items 23 through 27 on page 9 of her telephone bill evidence 
five additional telephone calls to her from Salt Lake City between the period of December 
3 and December 5, 2001, and that all those calls were probably from defendant. 
c. That she recalls sending defendant a Western Union money gram a 
few days prior to December 5, 2001, but did not know when she did so. 
d. That on December 5, 2001, she was on the telephone with defendant 
4 
fi 01 1:1 appi oxi mat z\y 6:22 p.m t a 6:29 : ' 
e. Ihat, during that telephone call, deleiicUnl was trying to get home lo 
Wyoming from I Jtah and was obtaining her permission to charge to Amanda Hernandez's 
F 
f rhat her telephone bill reflects that defendant made a telephone call 
to Margaret Puebla on December 5, 2001, which began at 6:53 n in and lasted seven 
n 111 1.1 ites. 
g. nihil she ra i led MatfMM 1 Pudi la .HI u S \ m in MIMMI dull drlnidanl 
had reached Margaret I 'uebla. 
h r"1 ' Margaret Puebla was on the phone with defendant at that time. 
15. Margau'i 1 u^. .« would have come to tiu
 t;iai and (estilkd a> lollows: 
•
 : I
 - ' - H i ! 
get home from Salt i_,cuw,. 
b H- u after the telephone call, she wired him $45 through Western 
IJnion. 
16. 1 1 ial • : : 1 inset's faili 11 e to pi irsi i€ at id :all 1:1 lese < * itnesses • :ai ises tt le C : 1  art 
great concern. 
17. The preliminary hearing and trial transcripts demonstrate that the robbery 
was com mitted during a. narrow periou *.. *...;v., an,; .: uay have made a signin .n : 
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available for Mr Hernandez's defense. 
18. Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were not alibi witnesses in the 
true sense of the word because their testimony would not have established that defendant 
was on the telephone with them at the same time the robbery was committed. 
19. However, Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were significant 
defense witnesses that would have given defendant a stronger defense than the defense he 
presented to the jury. 
20. Hernandez was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to investigate and call 
these witnesses 
DATED this n day of December, 2003^v t , 
The Hondr&ble William W. Barrett 
Judge, ThinLD^strict Court 
approved as to form H M > [%U4XJA^ 
Karen Klucznik ¥ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have e-mailed and mailed, first class postage prepaid, one 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to Assistant Attorney General Karen Klucznik, 160 
East 300 South, PO Box 140812, Salt Lake City, Utah 841,1470812, th i s / JJ_ day of 
December, 2003 
C0NSTITU110NAL PROVISIONS, S'l'A'l U1HS AND RULIi 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury 
shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no 
fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of 
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 (2004) 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to nave compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation. 
11 in i in, led Males Constitution, Amendmei it \ "' I 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the i ifrn. v eu> ^iu p ^ n e L ; JK 
by an impartialiurv of the State and district wherein the crim- have been committed, 
which district snail have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence. 
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*(iled States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 
nersons born or ik. ..n. m^ , uu. JUHMJIUIWII 
•of. are cit; '•- ttc wheiem tliev reside. No State 
make * privileges or immunities of citizens 
•*• I JniU ,: nor _ y person of lite. libcrt\. or pr« »pcrty, 
HII due process of law; nor deny lo an\ person with*:* ii> jurisdiction the e^ 1ill! 
protection of the laws. 
• ...i, \ ua . § ; 6 1 501 (200 \ ) 
\i) A uefendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each UU.K. 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of ^i™ 
proof the defendant shall be acquitted. 
•^\ v used v •*•* - -• «• , words "element of the offense" I I I <. -: 111: 
• • * IK conduce attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or 
forbidden in the definition .>' tV offense* 
euipabf* .ifonkil state required. 
he existence ofjurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be 
ed by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2004) 
I I | i | u I U I I M l U i l i l l l . il < »l n "On "i 1  1 
(a) the person unlawful!) aiui intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force *-i?e M . ^ 
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(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004) 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or 
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2004) 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense 
is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial 
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
iii 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense: 
(b) No accused person shall, be I ore final judgment, be compelled to advance mone> or 
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the 
• = '"those rights when received; 
(e) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
MI ) A u ifc shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband 
• si his wife; and 
(e) Nr person shun be convicted unless by verdict of a jur\. or upon a pk\* ol guilt) or no 
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in ease of an 
)ii, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
TTx:1- Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 
:
 •!• •; \it .tppii^.;..-, ! ' * i \ vi shail be v\ motion, nine!., m . 
niAg a trial or heaim^ -u •-'.-• ^ JIKI in accordance with this rule. A 
motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and 
the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless required 
by the court. 
(b) Request to S IMOII. When the time for filing a response to a motion and 
the reply ha.c '™ file a request to submit the motion for decision. The 
request shal (ioned "Request to Submit for Decision." The 
Request to Submit for he date on which the motion was served. 1 he-
date the opposing men ^s served, the date the reply memorandum, if 
any, was served, and w :ias been requested. The notification shall contain 
a certificate of mailing to all pai ues n n- • part)/ files a request, the motion will not *x 
submitted for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified \ny defense, objection or request, including request 
for rulings on the aamissil ice, which is capable of determination without i he 
trial of the general issue nia> uc IUI&CU prior to trial by written motion. 
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other 
than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection 
shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(e)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the date of 
encing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten days of the entn 
\ motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court 1 oi trowel 
j orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
'•" ••(] in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record. 
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(e) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
(f) Except injustices1 courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the 
hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(g) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in 
the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable 
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. Nothing in this 
rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in 
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall 
be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. 
If additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the 
hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or 
within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been 
held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or bv these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation oi 
v 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the 
trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the 
opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any 
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, 
except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information 
was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from 
testifying be received for these purposes. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 
vi 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(a)(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence 
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(a)(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of 
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction 
is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a 
subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, 
or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible 
under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile 
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be 
admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in 
evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of 
a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
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